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ALEXA, WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT PRIVACY? 
PROTECTING PRIVACY FOR USERS OF VOICE-
ACTIVATED DEVICES 
Anne Pfeifle* 
Abstract: Alexa, Amazon’s digital voice assistant, and devices like it, are increasingly 
common. With this trend comes growing problems, as illustrated by a murder investigation in 
Bentonville, Arkansas. Police wanted Amazon to turn over data associated with the suspect’s 
Echo device, hoping it had overheard something on the night of the murder. The case sparked 
wide-spread interest in the privacy implications of in-home devices that record audio of 
users. But the biggest threat to user privacy is not that Alexa may overhear a crime—it is that 
law enforcement will use such devices in new ways that users are not prepared for during 
investigations. Thus, a solution is needed for users to have the confidence and certainty that 
bringing these devices into their homes will not erode their privacy. This Comment proposes 
that companies should ensure privacy protections are engineered into their devices, and that 
legislatures should adopt forward-looking statutes to ensure protections for users. 
INTRODUCTION 
Several San Diego households were surprised when, in January 2017, 
Amazon notified them that they had attempted to buy a dollhouse.1 None 
of the families had placed an order for a dollhouse, yet Amazon tried to 
confirm the order anyway.2 Why did Amazon think each of these 
families had tried to order a dollhouse? The answer is Amazon’s in-
home, voice-activated device: the Echo.3 
Amazon’s voice-activated digital assistant, Alexa, powers Echo 
devices.4 The Echo works by listening for a wake word; by default, that 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank 
Professor Ryan Calo for his guidance, edits, and input. I would also like to thank the stellar team at 
Washington Law Review, without which this piece would not be possible. 
1. Andrew Liptak, Amazon’s Alexa Started Ordering People Dollhouses After Hearing Its Name 
On TV, VERGE (Jan. 7, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/7/14200210/amazon-
alexa-tech-news-anchor-order-dollhouse [https://perma.cc/UH38-354N]. 
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. Robert Hackett, Amazon Echo’s Alexa Went Dollhouse Crazy, FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/01/09/amazon-echo-alexa-dollhouse/ [https://perma.cc/EL4L-YCWX].  
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word is “Alexa.”5 Once “awake,” the Echo device responds to requests.6 
It can check the weather, order from Amazon, and search the internet.7 
In short, people use the Echo by talking to it. 
Returning to the mystery dollhouses: each of the dollhouse-ordering 
families owned an Echo and had been tuned into a certain news 
segment.8 That news segment detailed the story of an enterprising six-
year-old girl who had used her family’s Echo to order herself a 
dollhouse and four pounds of cookies.9 Near the end of the segment, the 
anchor said, “I love the little girl saying, ‘Alexa order me a 
dollhouse.’”10 That was enough to trigger Echo devices all around the 
San Diego area.11 
Though accidental orders are ultimately harmless, not all accidental 
Echo uses are as innocent. For example, police sought data from an Echo 
related to a Bentonville, Arkansas murder investigation.12 On November 
22, 2015, James Andrew Bates called the police to report that Victor 
Parris Collins was dead in Bates’s hot tub.13 During the investigation, 
police discovered that Bates’s Echo may have been used to play music 
that night.14 Accordingly, officers sought the Echo’s data.15 Bentonville 
police served Amazon with two warrants, each requesting the Echo’s 
data.16 But Amazon initially failed to provide information to the 
Bentonville police—specifically the recordings transmitted from the 
Echo to Amazon’s servers.17 In refusing to turn over the data, Amazon 
asserted opposition to broad requests for information and sought to 
                                                     
5. Change the Wake Word, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html? 
nodeId=201971890 [https://perma.cc/R2ZY-78UZ]. 
6. Differences Between Alexa Devices, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html?nodeId=202009700 [https://perma.cc/6S7Q-VTUX]. 
7. Taylor Martin & David Priest, The Complete List of Alexa Commands So Far, CNET (Dec. 18, 
2017, 3:20 PM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/the-complete-list-of-alexa-commands/ [https://perma 
.cc/TQ6N-6G5H]. 
8. Liptak, supra note 1. 
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id. 
12. Search Warrant Return at 9, State v. Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Apr. 18, 2016). 
13. Zuzanna Sitek & Dillon Thomas, Bentonville PD Says Man Strangled, Drowned Former 
Georgia Officer, 5NEWSONLINE (Feb. 23, 2016, 8:40 AM), http://5newsonline.com/2016/02/23/ 
bentonville-pd-says-man-strangled-drowned-former-georgia-officer/ [https://perma.cc/QB95-Q37J]. 
14. See Search Warrant Return, supra note 12, at 9.  
15. Id.  
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 9–10. 
15 - Pfeifle.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  7:51 PM 
2018] PRIVACY AND VOICE-ACTIVATED DEVICES  423 
 
protect Echo users’ privacy.18 But on March 3, 2017, Amazon finally 
agreed to turn over the requested data.19 
The rising prevalence of in-home, voice-activated devices like the 
Echo present on-going privacy concerns.20 Experts caution that the 
Bentonville case is merely the beginning—for example, the Echo could 
be remotely configured to record every word said in a home.21 Adding to 
this concern, current privacy laws are generally ill-suited to new 
technologies.22 
This Comment examines the current state of privacy protections for 
electronic communications, like the audio recordings captured by Alexa. 
This Comment proposes forward-looking solutions to deal with the 
increasing pace of innovation and will use in-home recording devices, 
like Amazon’s Alexa-enabled devices, as a way to explore this issue. 
This Comment focuses on Amazon and Alexa because the Bentonville 
murder case provides a timely example of the issues that all tech 
companies face—the on-going conflict between tech companies and law 
enforcement over users’ data. 
Part I will discuss current technologies and the current relevant law. 
First, section I.A will examine the existing legal protections for 
electronic communications. Next, it will review expert proposals for 
updating electronic communications protections. Then, this Comment 
will detail Alexa’s functionality, followed by the ongoing conflicts 
between law enforcement and technology companies. Part II will 
propose a two-pronged solution: one technological, one legal. 
Companies should “bake in” privacy protections so that the devices are 
engineered to protect users more effectively. In addition, this Comment 
                                                     
18. Christopher Mele, Bid for Access to Amazon Echo Audio in Murder Case Raises Privacy 
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/business/amazon-
echo-murder-case-arkansas.html [https://perma.cc/7PB5-PCM7] (“Without addressing specifics of 
the case, Amazon said in a statement that, as a matter of course, it ‘objects to overbroad or 
otherwise inappropriate demands.’”). 
19. Stipulation and Consent Order at 1, Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Mar. 3, 2017). Arkansas 
eventually dropped the case. Motion to Nolle Prosequi for Good Cause at 1, Bates, No. CR-16-370-
2 (Ark. Dec. 5, 2017). 
20. See generally, Mele, supra note 18 (describing privacy concerns related to in-home recording 
devices). 
21. See infra section II.A. 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. . . . This 
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” (citations omitted)). 
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will argue that new, flexible, forward-looking schemes are needed to 
protect users’ privacy, and that state law is best situated for that task. 
 
I. NEW TECHNOLOGIES REQUIRE RETHINKING OUR 
APPROACH TO PRIVACY 
First, this Part will provide a backdrop of the current legal landscape, 
discussing current privacy laws, including Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
federal law, and state law. Next, this Part considers experts’ proposals to 
revise current privacy law. Then, it will examine in-home technologies 
that capture voice recordings. Finally, this Part will analyze the historical 
disputes between law enforcement and technology companies. 
A. The Application of Current Privacy Laws to New Technologies 
Can Be Uncertain, Though Some States Are Making Changes 
As technology advances, and law enforcement seeks to use those 
advances to aid in criminal investigations, the current legal regime 
struggles to deal with novel situations and new uses of technology. This 
section will discuss the current landscape of privacy protections for 
digital communications. First, the section will review the state of current 
federal law regarding electronic privacy. Next, it will describe recent 
state laws aimed at consumer privacy for technological developments. 
Finally, this section will examine experts’ proposals on protecting 
privacy. 
1. The Supreme Court Has Not Yet Recognized a Privacy Interest in 
All Electronic Communications 
The Fourth Amendment protects the sanctity of the home,23 but the 
meaning of “home” grows more muddled as technology advances. In 
Kyllo v. United States,24 the Court held that the home’s sanctity cannot 
be breached by technology not in general public use.25 Law enforcement 
suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home in Oregon 
using high-intensity lamps, which give off a large amount of heat.26 
Accordingly, agents from the Department of the Interior used a thermal 
                                                     
23. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
24. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
25. Id. at 40. 
26. Id. at 29–30. 
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imager to scan the house from a van across the street.27 The imager 
showed that Kyllo’s house was significantly warmer than other 
neighboring houses, leading agents to conclude that Kyllo was growing 
marijuana.28 Traditionally, courts tie Fourth Amendment search 
questions to common-law trespass.29 But as technology has progressed, 
the analysis has shifted and courts now increasingly evaluate whether 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy using the standard set out 
by the Supreme Court: “‘the individual manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and 
‘society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’”30 The 
Court then found that “[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is 
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”31 
In contrast, when information leaves the home and is shared with 
third parties, courts have held that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.32 In California v. Greenwood,33 law enforcement agents 
suspected Greenwood was trafficking narcotics.34 The officer 
investigating Greenwood asked the neighborhood’s trash collector to 
give her Greenwood’s trash bags.35 The collector agreed, and the officer 
discovered items in the trash that indicated Greenwood used narcotics.36 
The officer used this evidence to get a warrant to search Greenwood’s 
home, where law enforcement officers found cocaine.37 Greenwood 
challenged the warrantless search and seizure of his garbage.38 But the 
Court found that leaving the garbage at the curb sufficiently exposed it 
to the public because garbage bags and bins are often accessible by 
“animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
                                                     
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 30. 
29. Id. at 31. 
30. Id. at 33 (citation omitted). 
31. Id. at 40. 
32. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 745–46 (1979). 
33. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
34. Id. at 37. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 37–38. 
37. Id. at 38. 
38. Id. at 39. 
15 - Pfeifle.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  7:51 PM 
426 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:421 
 
public.”39 Similarly, the Court also held that there is no expectation of 
privacy in dialed phone numbers.40 Likewise, the Court has not afforded 
checks, deposit slips, and other bank documents Fourth Amendment 
protection as they are shared with a third party: the bank.41 This idea that 
information shared with a third party is not subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection is known as the third-party doctrine.42 
However, cell phones are distinct, and they require their own warrant 
per Riley v. California.43 The Court held that a warrantless search of a 
cell phone was not reasonable, and the search did not fall under the 
exception provided by the incident to arrest doctrine.44 The Court 
explained that this heightened protection is needed because so much 
information can be stored on a cell phone—essentially a person’s entire 
life.45 The Court’s recognition of the vast amounts of data stored on cell 
phones—and generated by modern, daily life—was exciting to experts 
and commentators, because it seemed to signal the Court’s recognition 
that the digital world would require rethinking old decisions.46 But the 
Court limited the impact of its holding: “these cases do not implicate the 
                                                     
39. Id. at 35. 
40. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that installing a pen register at the 
telephone company and using it to learn the telephone numbers called from a private telephone was 
not a search because the numbers were revealed to a third party). 
41. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
42. Id. at 443. 
43. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
44. Id. at 2493. 
45. Id. at 2488–89 (“Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond 
those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. . . . [M]any of these devices 
are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. . . . One of 
the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity.”). 
46. See, e.g., Laurie Buchan Serafino, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need A Warrant for 
That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 
19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 160 (2014) (“Going forward, the Court may well find that when a 
citizen voluntarily provides information for storage with a third-party ISP she has not relinquished 
her Fourth Amendment protections.”); Marc Rotenberg & Alan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v. 
California, a Unanimous Supreme Court Sets Out Fourth Amendment for Digital Age, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-in-riley-
v-california-a-unanimous-supreme-court-sets-out-fourth-amendment-for-digital-age/ [https://perma. 
cc/XZ28-2END] (“The Court’s argument takes clear aim at the third-party rule . . . .”); How the 
Supreme Court Changed America This Year, POLITICO MAG. (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/how-the-supreme-court-changed-america-this-
year-108497?o=2 [https://perma.cc/P4WR-GDJE] (comments of Stephen Vladeck) (“But the 
rhetoric and reasoning of the majority opinion . . . reflect a court coming to terms with the ways in 
which modern technology destroys decades-old constitutional assumptions about the line between 
what’s public and what’s private, assumptions that only made sense in an analog world.”).  
15 - Pfeifle.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  7:51 PM 
2018] PRIVACY AND VOICE-ACTIVATED DEVICES  427 
 
question whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital 
information amounts to a search under other circumstances.”47 
That question—whether the collection or inspection of aggregated 
digital information amounts to a search—has now come to the Supreme 
Court in the form of cell site location information (CSLI).48 CSLI refers 
to the records service providers keep on which cell site a cell phone 
connects to during a call or text message.49 As a cell phone—and its 
user—moves through an area, it connects to different cell sites.50 This 
record of different cell sites allows investigators to approximate the 
location of the phone at different times.51 Thus, because service 
providers store CSLI, some courts have held that CSLI falls under the 
third-party doctrine.52 This group includes the Third Circuit,53 the Fourth 
Circuit,54 the Fifth Circuit,55 the Sixth Circuit,56 and the Eleventh 
Circuit.57 In contrast, district courts in the Second58 and Ninth59 Circuits 
                                                     
47. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–90 n.1. 
48. Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (mem.) (granting certiorari).  
49. WESLEY CHENG, CTR. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, DOES SEEKING CELL SITE 
LOCATION INFORMATION REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT? 2 (2016), http://web.law.columbia.edu/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/files/does_seeking_cell_site_location_information_ 
require_a_search_warrant_-_wesley_cheng_-_august_2016_update_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKB3-
VH5E].  
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Orin Kerr, Fourth Circuit Adopts Mosaic Theory, Holds That Obtaining “Extended” Cell-Site 
Records Requires a Warrant, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/05/fourth-circuit-adopts-mosaic-theory-
holds-that-obtaining-extended-cell-site-records-requires-a-warrant [https://perma.cc/CBW9-82HA]; 
see also CHENG, supra note 49, at 1. 
53. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010).  
54. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016).  
55. See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
56. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886–90 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 
137 S. Ct. 221 (2017).  
57. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015).  
58. In re United States for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. 
Supp. 2d 113, 119–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). But see United States v. Serrano, No. 16CR169 (WHP), 
2017 WL 3055244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) (finding that CSLI does not require a warrant 
because it falls under the third-party doctrine).  
59. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 
1036 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]he Court concludes that the third-party doctrine established in Miller 
and Smith does not defeat cell phone users’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical CSLI 
associated with their cell phones. The government therefore conducts a ‘search’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment when it asks cellular service providers to release that information . . . .”). 
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have ruled that law enforcement access of CSLI requires a warrant. Even 
the Fourth Circuit, which held that CSLI is subject to the third-party 
doctrine, indicated its uneasiness with its own decision, and noted that 
the time was ripe for the Supreme Court to step in and sort out the 
confusion: “[t]he Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even 
eliminate, the third-party doctrine. Congress may act to require a warrant 
for CSLI. But without a change in controlling law, we cannot conclude 
that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment in this case.”60 The 
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in another case to resolve 
this confusion over CSLI.61 
Although appellate courts have not found that CSLI requires a 
warrant, they have been quicker to grant protections to other types of 
electronic information, such as the Sixth Circuit’s third-party doctrine 
decision in United States v. Warshak.62 Warshak was the head of an 
herbal supplement company that allegedly engaged in numerous 
fraudulent schemes.63 Warshak, and others affiliated with the company, 
were charged with numerous crimes including conspiracy to commit 
mail and wire fraud.64 Before trial, the government had obtained 
Warshak’s emails from his internet service provider (ISP).65 Warshak 
argued that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
seizing about 27,000 emails without a warrant.66 The Sixth Circuit 
agreed.67 
The court first held that Warshak had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his emails.68 Second, the court noted that letters received 
protection, and it did not make sense for email to be afforded less 
protection than letters.69 Because the court found that emails were the 
functional equivalent of a letter or phone call, ISPs were thus equivalent 
to a post office or a phone company—the ISP makes the communication 
                                                     
But see United States v. Elima, No. SACR 16-00037-CJC, 2016 WL 3546584, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 
22, 2016) (holding that CSLI falls under the third-party doctrine).  
60. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016).  
61. See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 880. 
62. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
63. Id. at 280–81. 
64. Id. at 281. 
65. Id.  
66. Id. at 282. 
67. Id.  
68. Id. at 284.  
69. Id. at 286. 
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possible.70 And the court clarified that even if an ISP had an agreement 
with the user that the ISP could access the user’s emails, that access was 
not enough to defeat Fourth Amendment protections.71 
The Sixth Circuit noted that its decision was vulnerable in light of 
United States v. Miller.72 Miller, a Supreme Court decision from 1976, 
held that checks, deposit slips, and other bank documents do not receive 
Fourth Amendment protection because they are shared with a third 
party: the bank.73 But the Sixth Circuit distinguished Miller on two 
grounds.74 First, the relevant records in Miller were business records, not 
the potentially confidential records at issue in Warshak.75 Second, Miller 
gave the bank his records so that the bank could use them, while the ISP 
in Warshak was not the intended recipient of the emails, but merely an 
intermediary.76 Accordingly, the court found that “[t]he government may 
not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s 
emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”77 
But Warshak’s holding has not been adopted by the Supreme Court, 
despite the Sixth Circuit’s confidence that its holding can be 
distinguished from Miller’s holding.78 Moreover, though the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari to resolve the confusion over CSLI, no 
decision has been released as of this Comment’s publication.79 Although 
the third-party doctrine remains as it was in 1976,80 Justice Sotomayor 
has suggested it is time for change: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach 
is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal 
                                                     
70. Id.  
71. Id. The Court noted that in certain cases, an ISP with a broad right of access could “snuff out 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 287. 
72. Id. at 287 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).  
73. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
74. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
75. Id.  
76. Id.  
77. Id.  
78. Id.  
79. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, __ U.S.__, 
137 S. Ct. 221 (2017).  
80. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
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of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks.81 
2. The Status of New Technologies Under Federal Privacy Laws Is 
Uncertain 
The primary federal statute on technological privacy is the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).82 The ECPA authorizes 
prosecution of any person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to 
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to 
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”83 An electronic 
communication is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part 
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo optical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”84 The Act 
protects these communications while they are being made, while they 
are in transit, and when they are stored on computers.85 
Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act86 (SCA) as a 
subsection of the ECPA.87 It prevents stored communications from being 
divulged without consent.88 Under the SCA, electronic storage means 
“any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any 
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service 
for purposes of backup protection of such communication. . . .”89 There 
are exceptions for communications related to missing or exploited 
children, communications received inadvertently, and communications 
related to the commission of a crime.90 
                                                     
81. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted).  
82. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012). 
84. Id. § 2510(12). 
85. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, JUSTICE INFO. SHARING (July 30, 2013), 
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285 [https://perma.cc/9293-3H6R].  
86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
87. Id.  
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2702. 
89. Id. § 2510(17)(A)–(B). 
90. Id. § 2702(b).  
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The ECPA differentiates between communications intercepted in 
transit and information obtained from storage.91 It varies the legal 
protections afforded to communications based on the importance of the 
privacy interest involved.92 Consequently, some information requires a 
subpoena, including the amount of time a person has used an email 
address; some a special court order, such as opened email messages in 
storage; and some a search warrant, for example, the entire contents of 
an email account.93 Thus, information obtained from storage receives a 
more relaxed standard than information obtained in transit.94 
Additionally, if law enforcement seeks to access some types of data, 
then law enforcement must notify the subscriber—the person who owns 
the digital-storage account.95 For example, by giving notice, law 
enforcement can obtain everything in a subscriber’s account—except 
unopened email and voicemail—that has been in the account for less 
than 180 days, which they would not be able to do without notice.96 
But even in cases that require notice, the ECPA allows the 
government to obtain secrecy orders, so that the technology company 
cannot tell their users that the users’ data has been requested.97 Courts 
grant these orders when a law enforcement officer has “reason to 
believe” that the company’s disclosure might hinder an investigation.98 
These orders have many critics—including a recent challenge by 
Microsoft, which noted that “[n]othing in the statute requires that the 
‘reason to believe’ be grounded in the facts of the particular 
investigation, and the statute contains no limit on the length of time 
secrecy orders may be kept in place.”99 Microsoft alleged that in a 
twenty-month period, federal courts issued 3,250 secrecy orders to 
                                                     
91. Id. §§ 2510–11.  
92. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 85.  
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 85. 
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
95. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 85. 
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). But see Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(disagreeing with the government’s interpretation of ECPA and holding that email messages were in 
“electronic storage” regardless of when they were first accessed) (“[W]e think that prior access is 
irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage. Because plaintiff’s e-mail 
messages were in electronic storage regardless of whether they had been previously delivered, the 
district court’s decision cannot be affirmed on this alternative ground.”).  
 
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).  
98. Id. 
99. First Amended Complaint at 1, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538-
JLR (W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016).  
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Microsoft alone to prevent it from communicating with customers about 
requests for data, and of those about two-thirds had no end date.100 
Microsoft also asserted that users should not expect differing privacy 
protection schemes just because emails are stored in the cloud, rather 
than on the user’s hard-drive.101 
Experts, commentators, and service providers (like Microsoft) have 
criticized the ECPA for failing to keep up with changing technologies.102 
For example, ECPA does not provide transparency to users of 
technology.103 Similarly, experts call it a confusing statute because it is 
dense, and there are few cases interpreting it.104 Even the original drafter 
of the bill has called for it to be updated to match changing 
technologies.105 In short, many scholars have noted that the ECPA has 
not kept pace with changing technology. 
3. State Laws Respond More Quickly to New, Specific Technologies, 
and Have Greater Privacy Protections for Users 
State legislatures have taken a more proactive approach to changing 
technologies. For example, Washington limits the use of cell site 
simulator devices, which allow law enforcement to track a phone’s 
location in real time.106 Several states have enacted laws concerning 
access to and use of EDRs (Event Data Recorders, or “black boxes” in 
                                                     
100. Id.  
101. Id.; Brad Smith, Keeping Secrecy the Exception, Not the Rule: An Issue for Both Consumers 
and Businesses, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Apr. 14, 2016), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2016/04/14/keeping-secrecy-exception-not-rule-issue-consumers-businesses/#sm.000kdpjs21 
cmjdjbqlm2pl8sea7ki [https://perma.cc/T9G6-5443] (“If policymakers update the rules governing 
secrecy orders, we hope they will be guided by . . . principles that we think are important for our 
customers and for law enforcement. . . . [D]igital neutrality: Customers generally shouldn’t be 
entitled to less notice just because they have moved their emails to the cloud.”). 
102. Alexandra D. Vesalga, Location, Location, Location: Updating the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act to Protect Geolocational Data, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 459, 460 
(2013) (“[ECPA] fail[s] to consistently protect the geolocational data associated with electronic 
communications.”). 
103. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 99, at 3. 
104. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator’s Guide 
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004).  
105. Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Marks 25th Anniversary of ECPA, Announces 
Plan to Mark Up Reform Bill (Oct. 20, 2011), www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/? 
id=56C35200-EFDC-497A-9EAF-A75B498515B8 [https://perma.cc/FUU4-4XKG] (“[T]oday, this 
law is significantly outdated and out-paced by rapid changes in technology.”). 
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.270 (2016).  
15 - Pfeifle.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  7:51 PM 
2018] PRIVACY AND VOICE-ACTIVATED DEVICES  433 
 
cars).107 But no state has specifically addressed software like Alexa or 
devices like Echo.108 
States are well-suited to provide users with increased privacy 
protections because many state constitutions provide higher standards 
for privacy.109 For example, Washington has what is known as the 
“private affairs doctrine”: “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private 
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”110 Because of 
this doctrine, Washington does not use the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” framework used in federal courts;111 instead, the analysis 
focuses on whether something is a private affair: 
In determining whether something is a private affair (meaning 
“those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, 
and should be entitled to hold, safe from government trespass 
absent a warrant”), we consider both “the nature and extent of 
the information which may be obtained as a result of the 
governmental conduct” and the historical protection afforded to 
the interest asserted.112 
Thus, the private affairs doctrine leads to broader privacy protections 
than those provided by the U.S. Constitution.113 Specifically, 
government access to the following requires a warrant: phone records,114 
garbage,115 and motel registry information.116 
However, even the heightened protection provided by some states is 
not enough protection in a rapidly changing world for data that includes 
Alexa recordings, according to privacy advocates who continue to call 
                                                     
107. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 153–54 (2015); Privacy of 
Data from Event Data Recorders: State Statutes, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 
12, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-
of-data-from-event-data-recorders.aspx [https://perma.cc/WQ2R-JNBX]. 
108. See generally Peppet, supra note 107 (discussing regulations that currently exist concerning 
the Internet of Things).  
109. See, e.g., State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868–69, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014) (describing 
Washington State’s constitution).  
110. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
111. See State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 515, 688 P.2d 151, 153–54 (1984), abrogated on 
other grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).  
112. State v. Samalia, 186 Wash. 2d 262, 269, 375 P.3d 1082, 1086 (2016) (citation omitted). 
113. See, e.g., id. (describing Washington’s constitutional protections for privacy).  
114. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 63, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986).  
115. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578–79, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116–17 (1990).  
116. State v. Jorden, 160 Wash. 2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893, 898 (2007). 
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for expanded protections.117 A few states have responded to this call. In 
May 2017, Montana adopted a new statute limiting access to electronic 
communications stored by third parties.118 Significantly, Montana now 
requires probable cause before a government entity can require an 
electronic communications provider to disclose a user’s 
communications.119 But experts still have qualms about this statute120 
because governmental agencies can request that companies not disclose 
to users that their information has been requested.121 Referring to these 
requests as “gag orders,” experts note that Microsoft has challenged a 
similar issue on First Amendment grounds, arguing that orders 
preventing them from communicating with customers restrict their 
speech.122 Accordingly, privacy advocates are disappointed that a similar 
“gag order” provision was included the Montana statute.123 
Privacy advocates hail California’s law—the California Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA)—as “the most privacy-
protective legislation of its kind.”124 The law expands on California’s 
already heightened privacy protections.125 California’s constitution 
protects privacy explicitly,126 and California does not recognize the 
third-party doctrine.127 CalECPA provides more comprehensive 
                                                     
117. See, e.g., David Lazarus, When Your TV Can Spy on You, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015, 4:00 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-20150825-column.html [https://perma.cc/K6 
6B-9U5S] (describing concerns about in-home recording technology). 
118. H.B. 148, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017) (to be codified in scattered sections of MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 46).  
119. Id.  
120. See Adam Schwartz & Andrew Crocker, Montana Protects Communications Privacy, But 
Allows Gag Orders, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 1, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/ 
06/montana-protects-communications-privacy-allows-gag-orders [https://perma.cc/6FNP-SHKN]. 
121. Id.  
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. Susan Freiwald, At the Privacy Vanguard: California’s Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (CalECPA), 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939412 [https://perma.cc/F3KY-GBVQ]; see also ACLU 
News, In a Landmark Victory for Digital Privacy, Gov. Brown Signs California Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act into Law, ACLU N. CAL. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org 
/news/landmark-victory-digital-privacy-gov-brown-signs-california-electronic-communications-
privacy [https://perma.cc/A3YJ-ZND7]; Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital 
Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-
digital-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/6L3Q-PHWJ].  
125. See CAL. CONST. art I, § 1. 
126. Id. 
127. See People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 68, 71 (Cal. 1984) (requiring a search warrant for 
police access to a person’s unlisted name, phone number, and address), overruled on other grounds, 
People v. Palmer, 15 P.3d 234 (Cal. 2001); People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 747–48 (Cal. 1979) 
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protection to more categories of information than any other state.128 
Under CalECPA, law enforcement must obtain a warrant—limited 
appropriately in scope—before compelling the disclosure of electronic 
communications information from service providers.129 Though all 
warrants in California require that the warrant “particularly describe” 
what law enforcement agents intend to search,130 CalECPA goes further 
by requiring that the warrant describe “the information to be seized by 
specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the 
target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and 
the types of information sought.”131 Thus, CalECPA narrows potentially 
overly broad warrants by requiring that law enforcement more carefully 
delineate the parameters of the warrant.132 By adding more requirements 
to adequately circumscribe warrants, CalECPA prevents “fishing 
expeditions that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fourth 
Amendment.”133 
And though warrants under CalECPA must be narrow, the definition 
of “service provider” is broad, and includes services like Dropbox, 
Facebook, and Gmail.134 Because that definition is broad, it provides 
protections for users of a wide variety of services.135 Similarly, 
“electronic information” is broad and includes “technologically neutral 
language,” which ensures that future technological development is 
included.136 Significantly, CalECPA requires that the target of a warrant 
be notified.137 If that notice is delayed, the requesting governmental 
entity must explain why, once notice is given.138 In addition, when the 
target of a search is not identified, the California Department of Justice 
must be notified.139 This notification scheme is used in investigations 
where information is collected from unidentified targets, such as cell 
                                                     
(protecting telephone numbers); Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 594–95 (Cal. 1974) 
(protecting bank records). 
128. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 12.  
129. Id. at 15. 
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1525 (West 2017). 
131. Id. § 1546.1(d)(1). 
132. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 21–22. 
133. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted). 
134. Id. at 16. 
135. Id.  
136. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546. 
137. Id. § 1546.2. 
138. Id.  
139. Id.  
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tower dumps, where the government compels cell phone providers to 
turn over all the data from several cell towers that served a crime scene 
during the window in which the crime occurred.140 In short, “[c]ompared 
to ECPA, CalECPA requires warrants for more investigations, its 
warrants impose more restrictive requirements; it provides more notice 
to targets, and it furnishes more significant remedies.”141 
Experts note a few remaining problems with CalECPA, however. 
First, when and how information becomes an electronic communication 
is unclear in edge cases, such as if the communication is sent without 
human involvement.142 And because the definition of “service provider” 
depends on whether service providers give their subscribers the ability to 
send or receive electronic communications,143 the exact scope of the 
term remains murky as long as the definition of “electronic 
communication” remains unclear.144 Additionally, “subscriber 
information” is not subject to warrant requirements,145 but an “IP 
address” is subject to warrant requirements because it is an electronic 
communication.146 Sometimes an IP address acts more as an identifier 
for subscribers, such as when IP addresses are fixed and attached to 
devices, not communications.147 Thus, though experts suggest fixed IP 
addresses would require a warrant, courts have yet to clarify the issue.148 
Separately from CalECPA, California also has a law on connected 
televisions.149 Passed in response to consumers’ worries about their 
televisions “eavesdropping” on them,150 the law prevents recordings 
used to improve the voice recognition feature from being used for 
advertising purposes, and requires that “a person or entity shall not 
compel a manufacturer or other entity providing the operation of a voice 
recognition feature to build specific features for the purpose of allowing 
an investigative or law enforcement officer to monitor communications 
                                                     
140. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 28; see also In re Application for Cell Tower Records Under 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d), 90 F. Supp. 3d 673, 674 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (describing cell tower dumps). 
141. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 30. 
142. Id. at 38. 
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546(j). 
144. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 38–39. 
145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(f). 
146. Id. § 1546(j). 
147. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 39. 
148. Id.  
149. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.21 (West 2016). 
150. Lazarus, supra note 117.  
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through that feature.”151 In short, this law addressed worries about in-
home recording devices eavesdropping on consumers and protections for 
technology companies who hope to avoid being compelled to engineer 
their products in a way that is useful for law enforcement, instead of 
consumers.152 
Other states have moved towards enhanced protections as well. In 
March 2018, Washington passed a bill to “protect[] an open internet.”153 
Legislatures in twenty-six states have introduced bills requiring internet 
service providers to ensure various net neutrality principles.154 These 
laws are a response to Congress lifting the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) ban on selling users’ data without consent.155 The 
bills are focused on what companies can and cannot do with users’ 
information, and not whether the government needs a warrant to access a 
user’s information.156 But they show the increased support for and focus 
on what happens to users’ digital information.157 In sum, there is 
momentum in many states for more privacy protections for users of 
online service providers. 
4. Experts Propose Solutions at Every Level: Federal, State, and 
Entity 
To keep pace with quickly changing technology, experts, scholars, 
and privacy advocates have proposed a number of solutions to protect 
users’ privacy. Some scholars propose keeping the third-party doctrine 
for searches of electronic communications, but advocate that the law 
should distinguish between content and non-content.158 Content refers to 
the information contained in a communication, while non-content is 
                                                     
151. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.20. 
152. Id.  
153. S.H.B. 2282, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). Governor Jay Inslee signed the bill on 
March 5, 2018. Bill Information, WASH. GOVERNOR, https://www.governor.wa.gov/office-
governor/official-actions/bill-action [https://perma.cc/GR2G-5EL3]. 
154. Net Neutrality Legislation in States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Feb. 23, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/net-neutrality-legislation-in-states.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/S3U5-86U9]. 
155. Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-22, 131 Stat. 88 (codifying a joint resolution 
disapproving of the Federal Communications Commission rule “Protecting the Privacy of 
Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services”); see Net Neutrality Legislation 
in States, supra note 154. 
156. See Net Neutrality Legislation in States, supra note 154. 
157. See id.  
158. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007–08 (2010). 
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information relating to those communications.159 For example, the body 
of an email is content, while the size of the email, the date and time, and 
the recipient are non-content.160 Scholars propose that, once that 
distinction is made, courts should proceed “by applying the warrant 
requirement with person-based particularity restrictions.”161 These 
proposed restrictions would require that warrants be directed to a person, 
not a certain account, as people may have multiple accounts or share 
them with others.162 This approach would also exclude information 
found to be incidental to the specific person and crime.163 
However, other scholars contend that all digital information should be 
classified as content due to the vast quantities of data generated by 
modern life.164 They also worry that “re-entrenching the content/non-
content distinction will not address the longer-term concern: how to 
protect the privacy interests at stake.”165 Electronic communications blur 
the line between content and non-content, so scholars assert that 
continuing to hang substantive rights on rapidly eroding distinctions 
only narrows privacy rights.166 Because so much of modern life depends 
on entrusting third parties with information, some experts no longer 
think that it makes sense to rely on the third-party doctrine and would 
abandon it.167 
Another scholar proposes keeping the third-party doctrine, but 
returning it to the pre-Smith, “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
analysis168 as espoused in Katz v. United States.169 This proposal cites 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones to signify that the time has 
come for the Supreme Court to revisit the doctrine, and uses the concept 
of “smart homes,” or homes connected to the internet via devices like 
the Echo, to examine the doctrine.170 Given that in-home devices cross 
                                                     
159. Id. at 1008. 
160. Id. at 1030. 
161. Id. at 1048. 
162. Id. at 1047. 
163. Id. at 1047–48 (“[C]ourts should not admit evidence of crimes found in a search pursuant to 
an Internet warrant unless the evidence under consideration falls within the scope of the warrant.”). 
164. Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 553, 663 (2016). 
165. Id. at 663. 
166. Id. at 678. 
167. Id. 
168. Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits of the 
Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1942–45 (2017). 
169. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
170. Note, supra note 168, at 1932–33. 
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into the sanctity of the home, the proposal recommends that “the Court, 
when examining cases that implicate the third-party doctrine, can—and 
should—apply the Katz test in each instance.”171 In other words, this 
scholar proposes that the Court should hold that the proper inquiry is a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” even when information is disclosed 
to a third-party.172 
But other privacy advocates call for the focus to be on expanding 
existing state laws instead of waiting for the courts to abolish the third-
party doctrine or to modify it.173 California—with CalECPA—is a model 
in this area.174 Experts predict that state legislatures will look to 
eavesdropping statutes as a basis for expanding privacy protections.175 
However, current eavesdropping statutes turn on consent, but most 
devices owners are considered to have consented to the device’s 
listening.176 Experts suspect, though, that many users do not completely 
understand the scope of the recordings.177 In short, experts fear that users 
do not understand that they have already consented to being recorded, 
and that their consent means the recording could be used in court.178 
In sum, courts and legislatures have begun recognizing the privacy 
implications of electronic communications devices, though at differing 
rates. Federal lawmakers and the Supreme Court have generally been 
slower to anticipate change than state lawmakers. For example, the 
Supreme Court has yet to revisit the third-party doctrine,179 though at 
least one justice has suggested that it is time to do so.180 Experts also 
note the necessity of revisiting the third-party doctrine, given that 
sharing vast amounts of information with third parties is a virtual 
necessity of modern life.181 But other experts propose retaining the third-
party doctrine, and returning the doctrine to its “reasonable expectation 
                                                     
171. Id. at 1945. 
172. Id. 
173. Lazarus, supra note 117. 
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017).  
175. Alison DeNisco Rayome, Amazon Echo Murder Case Raises IoT Privacy Questions for 
Enterprise Users, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:34AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/am 
azon-echo-murder-case-raises-iot-privacy-questions-for-enterprise-users [https://perma.cc/WWW6-
EXEX]. 
176. Id.  
177. Id. 
178. Id. (“It’s likely that we will soon see state legislation looking more carefully at 
eavesdropping statutes.”). 
179. See Note, supra note 168.  
180. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
181. See Donohue, supra note 164.  
15 - Pfeifle.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  7:51 PM 
440 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:421 
 
of privacy” roots.182 In contrast, statutes like CalECPA require a warrant 
before the disclosure of electronic communications and are 
technologically neutral, meaning the statute does not reference any 
specific, current technologies, but instead anticipates that technology 
will change.183 In short, new technologies have thus far inspired a variety 
of proposals and responses. 
B. Alexa, Amazon’s Voice-Activated Digital Assistant, Is a Powerful 
Tool 
Devices like the Echo have sparked significant interest from 
consumers and law enforcement alike, though many misunderstand the 
technology. This section will discuss Alexa, Amazon’s voice-activated 
digital assistant, describe what kinds of devices use it, and explain how 
the software operates. Then the section will explain Amazon’s privacy 
policy and how data from Alexa-enabled devices are used. Finally, the 
section will discuss requests by law enforcement for users’ data. 
1. Alexa Records Users, Transmits and Stores Those Recordings, and 
Uses Them to Learn 
Alexa is Amazon’s voice-activated digital assistant.184 Alexa Voice 
Service can power any computing device connected to the internet that 
has a microphone and speaker.185 As the engine behind Amazon devices 
like the Amazon Echo, Echo Dot, and Tap, Alexa enables these wireless 
speakers to perform many tasks.186 These devices perform similar 
functions—responding to spoken requests—but vary by size and 
portability.187 
                                                     
182. See Note, supra note 168, at 1945. 
183. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017). 
184. Amazon Alexa, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa [https://perma.cc/ 
7BSA-3ANM]. 
185. Alexa Voice Service, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voice-
service [https://perma.cc/RB5T-RHAR]. 
186. Grant Clauser, What is Alexa? What is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get One?, 
WIRECUTTER (Jan. 6, 2017), http://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexa-what-is-the-amazon-
echo-and-should-you-get-one/ [https://perma.cc/48F7-4MWZ]; Echo Dot, AMAZON, https://www. 
amazon.com/All-New-Amazon-Echo-Dot-Add-Alexa-To-Any-Room/dp/B01DFKC2SO 
[https://perma.cc/Y2XD-9RY3]. 
187. Echo and Alexa Devices, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display. 
html?nodeId=202009700 [https://perma.cc/6S7Q-VTUX]. 
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Amazon calls Alexa’s voice-driven capabilities “skills.”188 Alexa can 
check the weather, report headlines, create shopping lists, order products 
from Amazon, search the internet, turn lights on and off, and even tell 
jokes.189 Developers can build these voice-controlled skills like they 
build phone applications.190 As a result, more and more skills are added 
to Alexa’s repertoire.191 For example, the number of skills grew from 
1,000 to 7,000 in seven months.192 
Like Alexa’s skills, the number of in-home digital assistants like the 
Echo is growing as well. In 2016, Amazon reported sales nine times 
greater than 2015.193 Many companies are introducing dozens of voice-
enabled devices, from refrigerators to televisions to cars.194 By 2020, the 
market for digital assistants is estimated to grow to $3.6 billion.195 
To use voice-enabled devices like the Echo or Echo Dot, users can 
use a wake word.196 By default, Alexa’s wake word is “Alexa.” Amazon 
engineers chose this word because it was unique, and users are unlikely 
to say it in natural conversation and inadvertently trigger Alexa to take 
action.197 When the device detects the wake word, it begins to record and 
transmit that recording, including a fraction of a second of audio before 
the wake word.198 To cut down on false positives, the device will 
transmit the recording to a cloud-based verification system, which 
                                                     
188. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html?nodeId=201602230 [https://perma.cc/LFW8-QLPT]. 
189. Martin & Priest, supra note 7. 
190. See Alexa Skills Kit, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-skills-
kit#Ready%20to%20start%3F [https://perma.cc/H8CC-5LKY]. 
191. Id.  
192. David Pierce, Alexa Just Conquered CES. The World Is Next, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2017, 6:15 
AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/ces-alexa-in-everything/ [https://perma.cc/M9JR-7V6D]. 
193. Alexa Devices Top Amazon Best-Seller List this Holiday – Millions of Alexa Devices Sold 
Worldwide, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20161227005118/en/ [https://perma.cc/6GJ5-LBC3]. Amazon does not report actual sales numbers.  
194. Pierce, supra note 192. 
195. Intelligent Virtual Assistant Market Overview, ALLIED MKT. RESEARCH (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/intelligent-virtual-assistant-market [https://perma.cc/RDF2-
9LFH]. 
196. Talk to Your Alexa Device, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display. 
html?nodeId=202013720 [https://perma.cc/9XQZ-V2RP]. 
197. See, e.g., Julie Bort, Amazon Engineers Had One Good Reason and One Geeky Reason for 
Choosing the Name Alexa, BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.business 
insider.com/why-amazon-called-it-alexa-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/2UHD-LHVD] (explaining how 
the name “Alexa” was chosen). The name “Alexa” also comes from the Library of Alexandria—the 
source of all knowledge. Id.  
198. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 188. 
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double-checks to be sure that the wake word was uttered.199 Alexa can 
then respond to the request.200 During activation, audio is streaming to 
the cloud.201 Storing data in the cloud allows uninterrupted access to the 
data, greater storage capacity, and lower cost, as there is no need for 
storage hardware.202 Data sent from an Alexa device to the cloud is 
encrypted.203 
Cloud storage also allows Amazon to associate recordings with the 
user’s Amazon account,204 which helps to improve Alexa.205 Alexa can 
learn a user’s voice patterns to better understand the user’s requests.206 
Gradually, the devices learn the user’s preferences and voice patterns.207 
Because Alexa is cloud-based, and not bound by a single device’s 
hardware constraints, complex computing—such as Automatic Speech 
Recognition and Natural Language Understanding—can be done.208 
Amazon also aggregates the anonymized recordings to help improve 
Alexa’s understanding of different speech patterns.209 Users can delete 
their recordings from their account, but Amazon cautions that deleting 
recordings will impair Alexa’s performance.210 
                                                     
199. Ted Karczewski, Cloud-Based Wake Word Verification Improves “Alexa” Wake Word 
Accuracy on Your AVS Products, AMAZON DEVELOPER (May 15, 2017), https://developer.amazon. 
com/blogs/alexa/post/b136b3e7-0ba8-4589-aaf9-2a037fc4e9c9/cloud-based-wake-word-verification 
-improves-alexa-wake-word-accuracy-on-your-avs-products [https://perma.cc/LK2M-9AEL].  
200. Talk to Your Alexa Device, supra note 196. 
201. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 188. The cloud refers to software and services 
(like storage) that run on the internet, and not on personal hardware, like a laptop or phone. Bonnie 
Cha, Too Embarrassed to Ask: What Is ‘The Cloud’ and How Does It Work?, RECODE (Apr. 30, 
2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.recode.net/2015/4/30/11562024/too-embarrassed-to-ask-what-is-the-
cloud-and-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/5NXR-DWG3]. 
202. What is Cloud Storage?, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/what-is-cloud-
storage/ [https://perma.cc/74TN-AE8A]. 
203. Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What Happens to That 
Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-record-
your-voice/[https://perma.cc/VVT2-R85Q]. 
204. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 188. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Echo Dot, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/All-New-Amazon-Echo-Dot-Add-Alexa-To-
Any-Room/dp/B01DFKC2SO [https://perma.cc/T4S8-A4AA]. 
208. Alexa Voice Service, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voice-
service/what-is-avs [https://perma.cc/6F9V-Z6F7]. 
209. Jing Cao & Dina Bass, Why Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Love the Sound of Your Voice, 
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-13/why-go 
ogle-microsoft-and-amazon-love-the-sound-of-your-voice [https://perma.cc/5DW7-ATQ8] (“Every 
hour, Amazon uploads Alexa queries to a vast digital warehouse.”). 
210. Id. 
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2. Police Sought Information from an Echo Device in an 
Investigation, and Amazon Pushed Back 
In what is believed to be the first case of its kind, police investigating 
a murder in Bentonville, Arkansas sought a warrant for records from an 
Echo in late December 2015.211 On November 22, 2015, James Andrew 
Bates called the police to report that Victor Parris Collins was dead in 
his hot tub in Bentonville, Arkansas.212 Bates, Collins, and a few other 
friends had gathered at Bates’s home to watch a football game.213 After 
the game, Collins and the others used the hot tub, while Bates went to 
bed.214 In the morning, Bates discovered Collins in the hot tub.215 During 
the execution of a search warrant, officers found an Echo in Bates’s 
kitchen,216 as well as other “smart home” devices that control the 
temperature and an alarm system.217 Because the Echo may have been 
activated around the time of Collins’s death, they sought to retrieve the 
records uploaded from Bates’s Echo.218 
Police served Amazon on December 4, 2015.219 Amazon did not 
provide the requested data.220 Police served Amazon with a second 
warrant, but Amazon still did not provide the information, specifically 
the recordings transmitted from the Echo to its servers.221 It moved to 
quash the search warrant, arguing that a heightened burden for 
compelled production applied in this case.222 Amazon also argued that 
the recordings may contain expressive content protected by the First 
Amendment.223 Seeking to protect users’ privacy rights from 
government intrusion, Amazon argued its customers’ data was 
expressive content, and was thus protected by the First Amendment: 
“[t]he fear of government tracking and censoring one’s reading, 
listening, and viewing choices chills the exercise of First Amendment 
                                                     
211. Search Warrant Return, supra note 12, at 9. 
212. Sitek & Thomas, supra note 13. 
213. Id.  
214. Id.  
215. Id.  
216. Search Warrant Return, supra note 12, at 8. 
217. Id. at 9. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 1, Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Feb. 17, 2017). 
223. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 2, Bates, No. CR-
16-370-2 (Ark. Feb. 17, 2017). 
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rights.”224 Amazon asserted that both recordings of a user’s speech and a 
transcript of Alexa’s response are protected First Amendment speech.225 
This protection stems from First Amendment protection of “not only an 
individual’s right to speak, but also his or her ‘right to receive 
information and ideas.’”226 
Amazon first argued that recordings of users’ requests for information 
are expressive information.227 It cited cases where an individual’s 
records of bookstore purchases were protected,228 and noted that Echo 
users play music, stream podcasts, and play audio books through their 
devices.229 Because the recordings reveal more information than 
bookstore records do, Amazon argued that they are subject to heightened 
First Amendment protections.230 Amazon then argued that Alexa’s 
responses are also protected. Alexa’s responses could include expressive 
material, like podcasts or audiobooks.231 In addition, the responses also 
include Amazon’s protected speech.232 Speech produced by search 
engines is protected,233 and like the content produced by those search 
engines, Alexa decides what information to include and the order in 
which it displays responses.234 
Amazon noted that its users’ purchases are expressive content, subject 
to First Amendment protections.235 Thus, like purchase history, Amazon 
argued that recordings from an Alexa-enabled device are also protected: 
“[u]sers convey, and the Alexa Voice Services returns, expressive 
content through their Alexa-enabled devices.”236 
                                                     
224. Id. at 2 (quoting Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 
2010)). 
225. Id. at 9.  
226. Id. at 10 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).  
227. Id. at 11. 
228. Id. at 10–11 (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57–58 (1953) (Douglas, J., 
concurring)) (citing Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1056–59 (Colo. 2002) 
(en banc)).  
229. Id.  
230. Id.  
231. Id. at 11. 
232. Id.  
233. E.g., Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. Civ-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at 
*4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (holding that search engine speech is protected). 
234. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash Search Warrant, supra note 223, at 
11–12, (citing Search King, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *4). 
235. Id.  
236. Id. at 5. 
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Because both the user’s recording and Alexa’s response are protected 
First Amendment speech, Amazon concluded that a heighted level of 
scrutiny applies when the government seeks data from Echo-enabled 
devices.237 So, according to Amazon, the government must show a 
compelling interest and a sufficient nexus between the information 
sought and the underlying investigation.238 Moreover, Amazon noted 
that past courts have applied this heighted standard when the 
government requested Amazon customer information.239 When the 
government requested customer information, it “chill[ed] the exercise of 
First Amendment rights . . . [and] ‘would frost keyboards across 
America.’”240 Finally, Amazon asked for an in camera review if the 
government’s request met this heightened level of scrutiny to “ensure 
that First Amendment concerns are properly protected with respect to the 
specific materials requested.”241 
But whether users’ recordings and Alexa’s responses are protected 
First Amendment speech with a heightened level of scrutiny is still an 
unsettled question: Amazon’s motion was dismissed as moot242 because 
on March 3, 2017, Amazon agreed to give the government the requested 
data.243 
                                                     
237. Id. at 12.  
238. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 78 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(applying heightened standard to grand jury subpoena for records of campaign contributions); In re 
Faltico, 561 F.2d 109, 111 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (applying heightened standard to grand jury 
subpoena for membership of trade association); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible 
Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, 706 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13, 16–21 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying heightened 
standard to grand jury subpoena seeking to compel company to produce records of customer 
purchases of movies); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002) 
(applying heightened standard to search warrant for criminal suspect’s book purchase records); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, 26 Media L. Rep. 1599, 1601 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(applying heightened standard to grand jury subpoena for Monica Lewinsky’s book-purchase 
records)).  
239. Id. at 12–13 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7, 2006, 246 
F.R.D. 570, 572–74 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (buyers’ personal identities and titles of books purchased 
through Amazon); Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (all 
Amazon purchases, including expressive materials)). 
240. Id. at 14 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7, 2006, 246 
F.R.D. at 573).  
241. Id. at 15.  
242. Stipulation and Consent Order, State v. Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Mar. 6, 2017). 
243. Id. It is unknown why Amazon changed its position, and ultimately, Arkansas dismissed the 
case. Motion to Nolle Prosequi for Good Cause, supra note 19. 
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3. Law Enforcement Requests for Data from the Latest Technology 
Are Nothing New, but That Is Not the Most Pressing Concern for 
In-Home Listening Devices 
The showdown between Amazon and the Bentonville Police 
Department is just the latest in an on-going string of clashes between 
technology companies and law enforcement agents regarding users’ 
information.244 The continuing disputes show there is a clear need for 
guidance from lawmakers.245 
The FBI in particular is an early adopter of technology. For example, 
in 2003, the FBI wanted to use technology like OnStar to eavesdrop on 
drivers.246 OnStar can provide audio and location information when the 
in-car cellular connection is switched on.247 Moreover, some cars 
equipped with satellite radio, like SiriusXM, can provide continuous 
location information to law enforcement.248 
As users share more data with more companies, requests for private 
data from those devices are becoming more common—and more 
concerning. In January 2017, law enforcement officers used data from an 
Ohio man’s pacemaker to charge him with arson.249 The Ohio man 
claimed that he awoke to the smell of smoke, rushed to gather his 
possessions, then leapt out the window. But the pacemaker data 
contradicted his story and showed that he did not exert himself when he 
                                                     
244. See infra notes 246–56. 
245. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417, (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More 
fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”); Stephen E. 
Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431, 435–36 (2013) (“[W]e now live in a world of ubiquitous third party 
information.”). 
246. BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. U., DON’T PANIC. MAKING PROGRESS ON 
THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 13 (2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/ 
Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AG2-LBVB]; Adam 
Liptak, Court Leaves the Door Open for Safety System Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/automobiles/court-leaves-the-door-open-for-safety-system-
wiretaps.html [https://perma.cc/ZKY6-MR8C]. 
247. Liptak, supra note 246. 
248. Thomas Fox-Brewster, Cartapping: How Feds Have Spied on Connected Cars for 15 Years, 
FORBES (Jan. 15, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/15/police-spying-on-
car-conversations-location-siriusxm-gm-chevrolet-toyota-privacy/#165713c649b5 
[https://perma.cc/9FDD-452A]. 
249. Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., A Man Detailed His Escape from a Burning House. His Pacemaker 
Told Police a Different Story., WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
to-your-health/wp/2017/02/08/a-man-detailed-his-escape-from-a-burning-house-his-pacemaker-
told-police-a-different-story [https://perma.cc/9PVL-MBBE].  
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claimed he did.250 The data from the pacemaker were so helpful that the 
officers have since made more requests for pacemaker data, leading to 
two homicide arrests.251 Data from fitness trackers, like the Fitbit, have 
been used to support a personal injury claim,252 undermine a rape 
claim,253 and contradict a suspect’s account of a murder.254 The power 
and promise of technological advances have intrigued law enforcement 
for a long time. But technology companies have trouble striking the 
balance between using their vast amounts of data to assist law 
enforcement255 and protecting their users’ privacy.256 
Though the Bentonville case is over,257 and as experts predicted, the 
outcome of the case did not change the status of privacy laws,258 the 
Bentonville case continues to provoke wide-spread interest and concern 
regarding the privacy implications of having a listening device in the 
home.259 And there are other ways that voice-activated devices could be 
used to assist law enforcement investigations.260 For example, the 
devices could be configured to constantly record a suspect.261 The 
                                                     
250. Id.  
251. Id.  
252. Kate Crawford, When Fitbit Is the Expert Witness, ATLANTIC (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/when-fitbit-is-the-expert-witness/382936 [https://perma 
.cc/J74V-ETTY].  
253. Kashmir Hill, Fitbit Data Just Undermined a Woman’s Rape Claim, SPLINTER (June 29, 
2015, 2:57 PM), https://splinternews.com/fitbit-data-just-undermined-a-womans-rape-claim-
1793848735 [https://perma.cc/P5DD-NUDB] (“[A] Fitbit device [the alleged victim] was wearing 
told a different story . . . . The device, which monitors a person’s activity and sleep, showed [the 
victim] was awake and walking around at the time she claimed she was sleeping.”).  
254. Jessa Schroeder, Fitbit Fitness Tracker Cracks Connecticut Murder Case, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Apr. 24, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/police-solve-connect 
icut-murder-clues-fitbit-activity-article-1.3094802 [https://perma.cc/ME7B-44CV].  
255. See Google ‘Reveals User’ Over Gmail Child Abuse Images, BBC (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28639628 [https://perma.cc/UQY6-VKS2].  
256. J. Freedom du Lac & Ellen Nakashima, Tim Cook: U.S. Government Wants ‘Something We 
Consider Too Dangerous to Create,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/17/apple-ceo-the-u-s-government-wants-something-we-consider 
-too-dangerous-to-create [https://perma.cc/YK7V-5YBB].  
257. Motion to Nolle Prosequi for Good Cause, supra note 19, at 1. 
258. Ángel González, Amazon Echo Search Warrant Could Spur New Prosecution Methods, 
Expert Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com 
/business/amazon/amazon-echo-search-warrant-could-portend-new-prosecution-methods-expert-
says/ [https://perma.cc/6E8B-9Y9M] (“Ryan Calo, a professor at the UW School of Law who 
specializes in privacy, robotics and cyberlaw issues, says the Bentonville Police Department’s 
fishing expedition is ‘unlikely to yield anything.’”). 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id.  
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devices would then serve as a bugging device—a microphone in 
someone’s house.262 A suspect’s interactions with a voice-activated 
device could also corroborate alibis.263 In addition, these devices could 
be configured to “listen” for keywords, much like the way Google or 
Microsoft scan emails or their cloud storage services for images of child 
abuse.264 So, a device could listen for not only its wake word, but words 
that are related to unlawful activity. It could also potentially be 
configured to listen for a kidnapped person’s voice. 
II. ADEQUATE PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR USERS OF IN-
HOME, CONNECTED DEVICES REQUIRES A TWO-
PRONGED APPROACH: ONE FOR COMPANIES, ONE FOR 
THE GOVERNMENT 
Against the backdrop of repeated law enforcement and technology 
company clashes, devices like the Echo starkly highlight the blurring 
between two different prongs of privacy: the sanctity of the home265 and 
the third-party doctrine.266 Emails and files like those at issue in 
Microsoft’s recent challenge267 already muddy the privacy waters, but 
voice-activated devices throw the inadequacies of existing doctrine into 
sharp relief. Voice-activated devices are both in the home—a place with 
the highest expectation of privacy—and share data with third parties—
the place with the least expectation of privacy.268 Some experts suggest 
                                                     
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Google “Reveals User” Over Gmail Child Abuse Images, supra note 255; Google Terms of 
Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/archive/2013111 
1-20140414/ [https://perma.cc/9P6C-5BHL] (“Our automated systems analyze your content 
(including emails) to provide you personally relevant product features, such as customized search 
results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection. This analysis occurs as the content is 
sent, received, and when it is stored.”). 
265. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
266. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979) (holding that installing a pen register at the telephone company and using it to learn the 
telephone numbers called from a private telephone was not a search because the numbers were 
revealed to a third party). 
267. First Amended Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2016 WL 3381727 
(W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR). 
268. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39–42; Smith, 442 U.S. 735; Talk to Your 
Alexa Device, supra note 196. 
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that bringing devices that transmit data to third parties into the home will 
normalize privacy intrusions.269 
Regardless, these devices’ dual nature shows the outdated nature of 
the third-party doctrine—especially when there is a valid warrant, as was 
the case in Bentonville. Focusing solely on judicial revision of the third-
party doctrine ignores cases like Bentonville, where there is a warrant. 
That warrant could reach vast amounts of data—data generated from the 
most intimate reaches of the home and shared instantaneously, and 
perhaps accidentally,270 with third parties.271 Accordingly, more than 
revision of the third-party doctrine is needed. Both the law and 
technology companies will need to change to best protect user privacy. 
This Part will recommend technological solutions and legal solutions to 
give users certainty in their privacy protections and companies guidance. 
A. Neither Technical Solutions nor Legal Solutions Alone Are Enough 
to Ensure Privacy Protections 
Technical solutions are needed in addition to legal solutions, because 
when the hurdle is technical, not legal, privacy protections for users are 
stronger, and the government is often less able to compel disclosure. A 
well-known example involves a dispute between Apple and the FBI 
following the 2015 San Bernardino, California shooting.276 On 
December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik shot and 
killed fourteen people and wounded twenty-two others in an attack in 
San Bernardino, California.273 The FBI investigated the attack as an act 
of terrorism because Malik had posted a pledge of allegiance to the 
Islamic State on his Facebook page.274 Questions remained whether 
                                                     
269. Apeksha Vora, Amazon’s Alexa: Convenience, for the Price of Privacy, GEO. L.: INST. FOR 
L. & POL’Y (May 23, 2017), http://www.georgetowntech.org/blogfulltext/2017/5/23/amazons-alexa-
convenience-for-the-price-of-privacy [https://perma.cc/9PWY-P64L]. 
270. Hackett, supra note 4. 
271. Jay Stanley, The Privacy Threat from Always-On Microphones Like the Amazon Echo, 
ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Jan. 13, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/privacy-
threat-always-microphones-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/X5H3-5YQ2].  
272. Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San 
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903 
ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/KH2Z-2TNS]. 
273. Mark Berman, One Year After the San Bernardino Attack, Police Offer a Possible Motive as 
Questions Still Linger, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2016/12/02/one-year-after-san-bernardino-police-offer-a-possible-motive-as-questions-
still-linger/?utm_term=.f9ce483e8b6b [https://perma.cc/6ZD3-5Y2W].  
274. Id. 
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anyone else was involved in or knew about the attack, leading to a 
dispute between the FBI and Apple over Farook’s iPhone.275 
The FBI asked Apple to help it gain access to the shooter’s iPhone.276 
The FBI wanted Apple to change the iPhone’s software to gain access.277 
This change would circumvent the phone’s encryption, allowing the FBI 
to attempt to guess the password.278 Normally, after someone tries to 
guess an iPhone’s password ten times, the phone will automatically 
erase all its data.279 The FBI wanted Apple to remove the limit on the 
number of guesses so that the FBI could use brute force to break the 
phone’s password—guessing millions of passwords in an attempt to 
unlock it—without losing the data.280 Apple opposed this, calling the 
FBI’s request “an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our 
customers.”281 Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, reiterated that Apple would 
comply with warrants and subpoenas, but that changing software would 
be “too dangerous.”282 Though the Department of Justice received an 
order from a magistrate judge to unlock the phone, Apple continued to 
resist.283 The FBI ultimately hired a hacker to access the phone, so Apple 
engineers were not needed to revise the software.284 
The FBI dropped the case, so the question remains open as to whether 
a technology company can be compelled to create access.285 The 
question continues to come up, however; in at least two subsequent 
cases, the FBI has considered returning to court to force Apple to help 
unlock an iPhone that belonged to a suspect.286 Though uncertain, the 
law could compel companies like Apple or Amazon to modify existing 
                                                     
275. Id. 
276. Nakashima, supra note 272. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. du Lac & Nakashima, supra note 256 (quoting Apple CEO, Tim Cook). 
282. Id. 
283. Nakashima, supra note 272.  
284. See Don Reisinger, Apple and the FBI Could Be Headed for Another Locked iPhone Battle, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 20, 2016, 10:49 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/10/07/apple-iphone-dahir-adan/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BT3-NR5S]. 
285. Id. (seeking to unlock the iPhone owned by Dahir Adan, the attacker who stabbed ten people 
in a Minnesota mall in September 2016); Matt Drange, Apple Fires Back in New York iPhone Case, 
Urges Judge to Deny Feds’ Appeal For Help, FORTUNE (Apr. 15, 2016, 06:09 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattdrange/2016/04/15/apple-fires-back-in-new-york-iphone-case-
urges-judge-to-deny-feds-appeal-for-help/#7a493bcd62f9 [https://perma.cc/ZE73-8CD2] (seeking 
to unlock a phone involved in a New York City drug ring). 
286. Reisinger, supra note 284. 
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software, but so far, technical solutions have allowed companies to resist 
changing their products in response to law enforcement requests. Thus, 
technical solutions that provide users with a backdrop of protection, 
coupled with legal protections that recognize the pervasiveness and 
importance of electronic communications, would give users confidence 
to bring tools like Alexa into their home. 
B. Companies Should “Bake In” Privacy Protections from the Very 
Conception of Consumer Technologies 
Companies could avoid the on-going friction with law enforcement 
and protect users’ privacy by ensuring their devices are technologically 
incapable of giving law enforcement too much insight into users’ data. 
Because the law can be slow to change, privacy advocates recommend 
that tech companies advocate on their users’ behalf, even if the law 
frustrates companies’ good intentions.287 Moreover, as the passage of 
CalECPA shows, many companies want to support strong privacy 
measures.288 Therefore, the private sector is likely an effective tool to 
drive change because it is ready and willing to protect users’ privacy. 
Some experts see the failure to protect privacy not just as a legal 
failing, but as technology companies’ failure.289 Investigators are 
inventive; they have used, and will use, new technologies for recording 
and tracking,290 so experts note Amazon’s failure to “bake in” privacy to 
the same extent as other devices.291 Though Apple has been criticized for 
privacy issues as well,292 it occasionally takes a different approach from 
Amazon. As just one example of a different approach to privacy in 
                                                     
287. Andrew Crocker, When the Law Stands in the Way of Tech Companies Standing Up for 
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action, Siri—Apple’s voice assistant—both anonymizes and encrypts 
voice data.293 Amazon’s Alexa does not anonymize data.294 
Experts point to both Amazon’s storage of conversations and the 
linking of those conversations to customers as privacy concerns that 
Amazon should have thought through before releasing Alexa to the 
public.295 A second concern noted by experts is technology companies’ 
lack of transparency. Companies should tell users about the requirements 
for, and disclosure of, their data.296 But other privacy advocates note that 
this lack of transparency is not companies’ fault;297 federal law often 
prevents technology companies from disclosing to users when their data 
is requested.298 As discussed in section I.B.2, Microsoft has challenged 
this provision of the law because it wants to disclose to users when law 
enforcement requests this data.299 So, lack of notice to users remains an 
issue, not only from the technology company but from the government 
as well.300 In short, experts have faulted companies for not imagining the 
ways that users’ privacy could be impacted by their new products. 
Similarly, experts have criticized Amazon for failing to think through 
the implications of the Echo and other Alexa-enabled devices from the 
very beginning of the devices’ creation.301 Amazon could have avoided 
its recent fight with the Bentonville Police Department from the outset 
by making technological changes to its product, like anonymizing 
data.302 In contrast to the Apple cases, the Bentonville case presents a 
legal question, not a technical one.303 The Bentonville Police Department 
did not need Amazon’s help unlocking data stored inside a specific Echo 
(the data were on its servers the entire time), but the FBI did need 
                                                     
293. See Stoller, supra note 289. 
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295. Stanley, supra note 271. 
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Apple’s help to unlock an iPhone.304 In other words, the barrier to 
Apple’s compliance was both legal and technical, while the barrier to 
Amazon’s compliance was solely legal. Thus, at least some of the 
privacy concerns can be alleviated by technical changes to the Echo 
device. 
Technical changes would help to ensure stronger privacy protections 
for users. In addition, technical changes would give users more control 
over and transparency regarding what is done with their data. These 
changes could include the following: (1) shortening data retention 
periods; (2) providing notice to consumers when law enforcement 
requests their data; (3) establishing obvious cues that devices are 
recording; (4) engineering protections against turning in-home recording 
devices into bugs; (5) storing as much data as possible on the device, not 
in the cloud; and (6) enshrining the company’s commitment to never 
scanning for offensive keywords and concepts, or terms related to illegal 
activity, in its terms of service. 
First, technology companies should shorten the period they retain 
recordings. Shortening retention would decrease the amount of data 
available to law enforcement.305 For example, Amazon retains 
recordings until users delete them.306 In contrast, Apple retains data from 
its voice assistant for up to two years, and most of that time the data is 
anonymized.307 Amazon could do something similar and retain 
recordings of Alexa requests for a limited time.308 If Amazon wanted to 
use the recordings to improve Alexa’s performance, it could also 
anonymize the data after six months, or a similar period of time.309 
Second, companies, whenever possible, could give users clear notice 
regarding what is happening with their recordings. Users could be 
clearly notified about what happens to their data and recordings when 
they buy the device, in the way that California mandates for smart 
                                                     
304. Id. 
305. Donohue, supra note 164, at 663. 
306. See Stanley, supra note 271. 
307. Robert McMillan, Apple Finally Reveals How Long Siri Keeps Your Data, WIRED (Apr. 19, 
2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/siri-two-years/ [https://perma.cc/P6YM-73F4] 
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months for testing and product improvement purposes.”); Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, https:// 
www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/DBR9-CC53].  
308. Our Approach to Privacy, supra note 307. 
309. E.g., McMillan, supra note 307 (describing how Apple anonymizes data after a period of 
time, then deletes the data). 
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TVs.310 Users could again be notified when they first use the device and 
when law enforcement requests users’ data.311 As Microsoft’s recent 
litigation regarding secrecy orders demonstrates, the ability to notify 
users is not assured.312 But in cases where technology companies are not 
under a secrecy order, they could notify users of requests for their data to 
maintain transparency. 
Third, devices could have obvious visual indicators regarding 
collection and transmission of data. Similar to giving users notice, 
indicators that the device is activated gives users more control over their 
privacy. The device’s hardware could clearly indicate when the device is 
recording.313 For example the Echo device lights up when it is 
recording.314 Then, a separate cue, such as a different colored light, 
would show that the device is transmitting that recording.315 And when a 
user wants the device to stop recording, there could be a way on the 
hardware to do that—not just a software switch.316 The goal of including 
hardware indicators and switches is to give users certainty and control 
over the device’s recordings, in the way that a user might put a sticker 
over a laptop’s camera,317 unplug a smart TV, or mute an Echo.318 
Fourth, companies should make remote conversion of devices 
technically impossible—or as close to that as possible.319 For example, 
experts worry that the Echo could be “switched on” to become a remote-
accessed recording device without the user’s consent.320 Just as iPhones 
do not come enabled with software to circumvent their encryption,321 
other devices should be similarly protected. Thus, Amazon might restrict 
the use of their Alexa technology to devices that can not be “back-
doored” or turned into truly always-on devices. Accordingly, both the 
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device itself should be secure and the transmissions should be secured 
with strong encryption. 
Fifth, as much processing as possible should be done on the device 
itself—not in the cloud.322 As long as the third-party doctrine is still in 
place, sending data to companies who store it on the cloud erodes users’ 
privacy.323 Additionally, tech companies should encrypt data on the 
device as well.324 For example, Apple avoided creating software for the 
FBI to access locally stored information.325 If that information was 
stored on the cloud, then it would have been accessible under the third-
party doctrine. Because the law has struggled to keep pace with 
technology’s changes, companies have a heightened responsibility to 
protect users’ privacy themselves. 
Lastly, companies should modify the terms of service to protect users’ 
privacy. By committing to never perform constant monitoring for 
keywords—whether offensive or related to illegal activity—in the terms 
of service, companies would give users more certainty regarding their 
information and more clarity about what happens to that information.326 
In sum, while no company is a completely perfect example of privacy 
protections, the steps each company has taken so far demonstrates that 
privacy and business goals are not at odds. 
C. CalECPA Is a Step in the Right Direction, and Other States Should 
Follow Suit 
Given the disputes between law enforcement and technology 
companies, lawmakers should provide citizens, living in an increasingly 
digital world, with more clarity regarding their legal privacy protections. 
State legislators have started responding to concerns about privacy for 
electronic communications more quickly and comprehensively than 
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federal lawmakers.327 For example, California enacted its law on smart 
TVs before CalECPA.328 But state legislatures are reacting to headlines: 
California passed the law on smart TVs in response to headlines 
regarding eavesdropping TVs,329 while other states moved to protect 
users’ private information from being sold after Congress repealed 
FCC’s ban on selling users’ data without consent.330 But instead of 
reacting to the news cycle, states should look forward. 
Experts have celebrated California and CalECPA as the pinnacle of 
this forward-looking response. Other state legislatures should follow 
suit, and adopt flexible, forward-looking, CalECPA-like schemes. 
CalECPA stops overly broad warrants, thereby preventing “fishing 
expeditions that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fourth 
Amendment.”331 Importantly, CalECPA also uses “technologically 
neutral language,”332 which ensures that users who adopt any new 
technologies are protected.333 In short, the momentum generated by 
attention-grabbing headlines can be used by state legislatures to enact 
CalECPA-like statutes. The public’s support for privacy protection 
exists,334 and states should use that support to draft forward-looking 
statutes that anticipate new technologies. 
Experts suggest that eavesdropping statutes could serve as a 
framework for new privacy protections.335 As discussed above, a 
problem with current eavesdropping statutes is that they turn on 
consent.336 When a person consents to a recording, they no longer have a 
privacy interest in that recording, and it can be shared widely.337 But 
most devices owners are considered to have consented to the device’s 
                                                     
327. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Push for Internet Privacy Rules Moves to State Houses, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/technology/internet-privacy-state-
legislation-illinois.html [https://perma.cc/YMM8-VBCT] (noting that many state legislatures have 
introduced privacy legislation).  
328. See supra section I.A.3. 
329. Lazarus, supra note 117 (“[W]e should look next to a ban on data from all in-home smart 
appliances being used for advertising purposes.”). 
330. See supra notes 153–57. 
331. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 21. 
332. Id. at 17. 
333. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017). 
334. Joseph O’Sullivan, Washington State Lawmakers Move to Secure Internet Privacy After 
Changes to Federal Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017, 7:52 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/ 
seattle-news/politics/state-lawmakers-move-to-secure-internet-privacy-after-changes-to-federal-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/2K49-QJYG]. 
335. DeNisco, supra note 175. 
336. See supra section I.B.3.  
337. See supra notes 173–78.  
15 - Pfeifle.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  7:51 PM 
2018] PRIVACY AND VOICE-ACTIVATED DEVICES  457 
 
listening, meaning that they have little protection for their privacy 
interests in the recordings.338 Experts fear that many users do not 
understand that using the device means they consent to the recordings.339 
Accordingly, legislators should step in to protect users’ privacy. Under 
CalECPA, Amazon would be a service provider, and the recordings, 
electronic communications.340 Thus, the recordings would receive 
privacy protections, including requiring a warrant to access.341 Similarly, 
CalECPA requires notice to users when law enforcement requests their 
data, giving users more transparency regarding their data.342 
Though the Supreme Court may seem like the most effective venue 
for change to the third-party doctrine,343 the Court is necessarily 
reactive, and not forward-looking as is required to address these 
problems.344 First, Supreme Court holdings tend to be narrow in the 
Fourth Amendment context,345 unlike the broad protection provided by 
CalECPA.346 Second, upcoming cases regarding cell-site location data 
are tempting vehicles for third-party doctrine reform,347 but those 
holdings will likely rest on narrower grounds.348 
In sum, lawmakers should recognize that sharing digital information 
with third parties is a near-necessity of modern life, and new laws should 
ensure that this sharing does not erode users’ expectations of privacy. 
Moreover, laws should anticipate that technology will change, and not 
simply react to the latest device that makes headlines. Providing 
background rules will benefit both companies and users: users will feel 
comfortable knowing their recordings are protected by heightened 
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warrant standards, and companies will then benefit from increased 
consumer confidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal laws and jurisprudence regarding digital privacy have not 
responded fast enough to changing technologies.349 And though state 
legislatures have moved faster than either courts or Congress, they tend 
not to be proactive.350 Thus, a two-pronged approach is needed: 
companies should engineer privacy into their devices,351 while 
legislatures should legislate to ensure electronic communications stored 
with technology companies are properly protected.352 CalECPA provides 
a model for the type of flexible, forward-looking statute needed.353 
Building on the momentum of support for privacy legislation prompted 
by recent congressional action, other states should adopt their own 
CalECPA-like statutes, taking into account CalECPA’s (few) failings.354 
Tech users should look to their states to protect privacy, as many states 
have already-heightened protections and could continue to take the lead 
in this area. 
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